區塊鏈:什麼是比特幣的自私挖礦?

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What is Bitcoin Selfish mining?

Antonio Madeira 26 Jul 2018

Selfish is an attack on the integrity of the Bitcoin network. This is where one miner,or mining pool, does not publish and distribute a valid solution to the rest of the network.
自私是對比特幣網路完整性的攻擊。
一個礦工或礦池不向網路的其餘部分公佈和分發一個有效的解。

The selfish miner then continues to mine the next block and so on maintaining its lead. When the rest of the network is about to catch up with the selfish miner, he, or they, then release here portion of solved blocks into the network.
自私的礦工然後繼續挖掘下一個區塊,繼續保持他的領先地位。
當網路的其餘部分即將趕上自私的礦工時,他才向網路釋放已解出的區塊。

The result is that their chain and proof of work is longer and more difficult so the rest of the network adopts their block solutions and they claim the block rewards.
結果是,他的鏈和工作量證明更長和更困難,因此,網路的其餘部分採用他的區塊解,他獲得了區塊獎勵。

The selfish mining attack is a method for mining pools to increase their returns by not playing fair. Although this can be seen in some crypto currencies where pool shares are not so fairly distributed it is more difficult to carry off with Bitcoin.
自私挖礦攻擊是礦池使用的一種方法:通過不公平的玩法,增加他們的回報。
雖然這可以在某些加密貨幣中看到,在那裡,礦池份額不是完全分散的,但用比特幣更難完成這個。

It is also advantageous for a mining pool to increase in size to be able to perform selfish mining. At over 51% of network power the returns earned by a selfish mining pool are justified as probabilistically they can maintain their advantage in terms of hashing the next block. As the mining pool controls the majority of the network hashing power it can also censor or nullify certain transactions essentially holding the network to ransom.
對一個礦池來說,增加能夠執行自私挖礦的大小,也是有利的。
在超過51%的網路功率下,一個自私礦池所獲得的回報是概率性的,它可以通過雜湊下一個區塊來維持它的優勢。
由於礦池控制了網路雜湊功率的大部分,它也可以審查或取消某些交易,本質上是把網路據為己有。

There have been BIPS, Bitcoin Improvement Proposals, to lower the probability of a selfish mining attack such as randomly assigning miners to various branches when a fork occurs – or alternatively providing a threshold limit to which a mining pool can reach. This is the same as Governments trying to halt natural monopolies to allow competition.
已經有BIPS,以降低自私挖礦攻擊的概率,例如當分叉發生時,隨機分配礦工給不同的分支,或者可以提供一個礦池所能達到的閾值限制。這與政府試圖停止自然壟斷以允許競爭的做法一樣。

A further solution is to discriminate against a block depending on the timestamp it was released – so if a miner releases a long list of blocks in one shot – then the rest of the network would weight their validity against the timestamp they were hashed and the timestamp they were reported to the network.
另一種解決方案是根據時間戳來區分割槽塊,這樣,如果一個礦工在很短的時間內釋放了很多區塊,那麼,網路的其餘部分將根據區塊被雜湊的時間戳,以及區塊被報告到網路上的時間戳,來對其## 標題 ##有效性進行加權。